

Exhibit E

Louisiana State Police Hazardous Materials Incident Report

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT REPORT

Louisiana State Police

Transportation and Environmental Safety Section II G Region Troop Incident # 06-05324 Officer S. Hopkins RTKNumber 0830 Enforcement MCSAP 8/24/2006 Time Occurred Date 0854 Parish Webster Notified Date 8/24/2006 Time Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant, Doyline, LA 0900 Incident Location 10-97 Date 8/24/2006 Time 10-8 Date 8/29/2006 Time 1800 SHIPPER / FACILITY INFORMATION Shipper / Facility Explo Systems Inc 71055 Minden State LA Zip City 1702 Fourth Street Address Telephone 318-382-8700 David Smith Title Vice President Representative CARRIER INFORMATION Carrier Information City State Zip Address Telephone Representative Title DRIVER INFORMATION Driver/Operators Name City Address State Zip DOB Drivers Lic # State Class Telephone INCIDENT TYPE CONTAINER TYPE Highway Water Rail Bottle, Pail, Bag Drum Air Storage Tank Container Cylinder Portable Tank Tank Truck X Fixed Site Pipeline Explosive Intermodal Tank Barge, Vessel Rail Car Investigation Other X Other Totes Industrial Facility Chemical Involved Tritonal Amount unknown Amount Lost AGENCIES ON SCENE State X Federal Name BATFE Local Rep Local X State Federal Name LA National Guard Rep X State Federal Webster Parish Sheriffs Office Local Name Rep Local State Federal Name Rep HIGHWAYS CLOSED Highway # I-20 Time Closed 0910 Time Opened 1445 Highway # US 80; LA 164; Goodwill Rd; Time Closed 0910 Time Opened 0930 8/25/06 PROTECTIVE ACTION Shelter in Place X Evacuation Road Closure None Impacted Area Follow-up Field Injuries X **Fatalities** Initial Field Investigation **Photographs** Video Investigation WEATHER CONDITIONS Wind Speed Temperature mph Direction Humidity REMEDIATION/MUTUAL AID RESPONSE 703-724-9600 On Scene UXB International Inc Jim Tomiko Telephone Rep

Rep

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Telephone

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On Scene

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Site Photographs				Meteorological Information					Facility Investigative Documents		
Facility Monitoring Data				Employee Interviews				х	Facility Drawings or Blueprints		
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miles, which included I-20; LA 80; LA 164; Goodwill Road; Town of Doyline; and all areas of the Ammo Plant. At 1000 hours evacuation began and roads were closed.

An incident command post was set up at the intersection of Goodwill Road and LA Hwy 80.

At 1330 an aerial reconnaissance was conducted by Officer Hopkins and Lt Viator. Recon revealed all of the buildings containing explosives had burned down. Small fires were still burning in numerous locations in and out of the fenced perimeter of E-line. No evidence of a large quantity of unexploded bombs massed in one area was visible.

Explo Systems employees revised the estimated number of bombs located at the loading dock to be 26 each. Based on the reconnaissance and this estimate, the hazard area was reduced to 1.5 miles. This revision allowed I-20 to be reopened but all other previously closed highways remained closed. All previously evacuated facilities remained closed. Because of the numerous fires, a ground reconnaissance was scheduled for 0700, 8/25/2006.

At 0715 hours, 8/25/2006, a ground reconnaissance was conducted by State Police Hazmat and COL Stuckey, LAAP commander. Ground recon concluded there were no large quantities of unexploded bombs in any one location. Numerous unexploded bombs were scattered about the facility. Based on the fragmentation range of one unexploded bomb, the hazard area was reduced to 1400 yards. This reduction allowed all evacuees to return. The incident command post was moved to the intersection of 4th Street and McArthur Ave.

On 8/27/06, UXB International personnel arrived on scene to assess the damage and prepare for site cleanup. An assessment of E-line and the surrounding area indicated a sweep outside the perimeter fence should be conducted for a distance of 1000 feet around the north end and a

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distance of 500 feet around the south end of the perimeter fence. The recovery of fully loaded bombs was to be accomplished first. The pricrity of operations was to clear the north end of the exclusion area outside the perimeter fence, then the south end of the exclusion area outside the perimeter fence, then the inside areas of the perimeter fence. This would allow the exclusion area to be reduced as quickly as possible allowing workers back into the areas.

Cleanup operations began on Monday, 8/28/06. By 1800 hours the north areas outside the perimeter fence had been searched and bomb recover was started. By Tuesday 8/29/06 at 1800 hours all areas had been searched for explosive materials and all fully loaded bombs had been transported to magazines for storage. The 1400 yard hazard area was removed and the incident command post was removed. All areas outside the fenced perimeter of E-line were opened. UXB personnel began recovery of loose energetic material inside the perimeter on 8/30/06 and continue at the time of this report.

Further investigation revealed the following information.

Bombs were brought from a magazine to the north receiving dock of E-line by truck. The bombs were moved into building 1726 where they received scores in the steel surface of the bomb by a remotely operated lathe. The bomb was then moved to a press where the 3 bomb sections were broken apart. The nose and tail were taken back to the dock to load onto a trailer. The center section was placed in another press where the explosives were pressed out of the steel case. The empty steel center section was stored in building 1726 until moved to a burn pad on another site on LAAP for burning off the explosive residue. The explosives from the center section were taken to the trailer with the nose and tail sections. When the trailer was full it was taken to Building 1719.

At Building 1719 the nose section, tail section and bulk explosives from the center section, were taken to the third floor where they were placed on the pre-melters. Pre-melters used steam heat to heat the explosives to 220 degrees. When the explosives on the pre-melter become liquid, they drain off through pipes to the 2nd floor where they are collected into kettles. There 4 kettles, one pre-melter fills one kettle. In the kettle the explosives are heated and the aluminum settles to the bottom of the kettle and the melted that is sent to the flaker where it is cooled and flaked into it's final state. Flaked that is boxed and sent to Building 1712 for transport to storage magazines.

On the morning of the fire, the reported quantity of explosives was 15000 pounds of flaked tnt in Building 1712; 10000 pounds of melted tnt in Building 1719; 8000 pounds of bulk explosive in Building 1724; and 36000 pounds net explosive weight in 96 bombs at the loading ramp of Building 1726.

, Gibsland, LA S An interview of Explo Systems employee (b) (6) DOB: , was conducted on 8/31/06 at 1500 hours. (b) (6) stated he worked for Explo Systems as lead man in the pre-melt room located on the third floor of building 1719. (6) stated he has worked at LAAP on various lines for a number of years. He supervised one other employee that morning, (b) (6) . The pre-melt room contained 4 pre-melters. Bomb components and explosives were on pre-melters 3 and 4. Kettle 4 had approximately 6000 and kettle 3 had approximately 3000. Kettle 1 and 2 were empty. (5) (6) didn't normally start the flaking process until both kettle 3 and 4 were full at 6000 pounds each. During (b) (6) shift, he was responsible for filling kettle 1 and 2 and the previous night shift was responsible for filling kettle 3 and 4. (b) (6) stated he moved the material being melted off pre-melter 4 onto pre-melter 3 to fill the partially full kettle 3. He then began cleaning pre-melter 1 and 2. (6) stated cleaning premelters consisted of using a stainless steel tool to rake the residue, aluminum and tnt, from the grate that the explosives sit on while melting. Both pre-melter 1 and 2 were not being used but had liquid tnt in them. (b) (6) stated he had finished pre-melter 1 and was working on premelter 2 when he observed smoke coming from under the grate of pre-melter 1. He stated he went to look at the smoke and observed a flame inside the pre-melter. (b) (6) stated he sent his helper to notify the other employees while he left the area.

The fire spread from Building 1719 to other buildings on E-line by traveling the wood hallways that linked the buildings together. The only building linked by hallways that was not burned was building 1714. A section of the wooden hallway had been replaced with metal roofing and siding creating an effective fire break.

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