FACILITY: Wayne Disposal, Inc. (Wayne)

Belleville, Michigan MID 048 090 633 RCRA Appeal No. 90-9

PETITIONERS: - Wayne

- Ford Motor Company (Ford)

PETITIONS FILED: May 1, 1990

STATUS OF PETITIONS: See Permit Appeal Status Report

ISSUES: - Other corrective action issues (corrective action provisions

not in the draft permit)

- Procedural issues

- Level of detail


Joint permitting

- Miscellaneous other issues (permit conditions that are technically inappropriate; inclusion of Ford as permittee)

Summary of Petition:

Since 1969, Ford has allowed Wayne to use their land owned by Ford in Belleville, Michigan, to construct and operate a hazardous waste disposal facility. Ford and Wayne are petitioning for review of the HSWA permit issued by Region 5 that names both companies as permittees. Both petitioners assert that there is no authority under Federal law to include Ford as a permittee. Wayne also objects to including final permit conditions that were not in the draft permit and several technically inappropriate requirements.

- Corrective Action Provisions not in the Permit. Wayne objects to four corrective action conditions in the final permit that were not included in the draft permit:
 - The deadline for submitting financial assurance for corrective action;
 - Corrective action requirements for releases from solid waste management units (SWMUs);



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
- Information requirements for SWMUs; and
- Corrective action requirements for newly-identified SWMUs.
- Procedural Issues. Besides the four corrective action provisions mentioned above, Wayne contends that four additional conditions in the final permit were not present in the draft permit, the:
 - References to "hazardous constituents" in Conditions I.D.13 and V;
 - Recording requirements in Condition I.D.9.c;
 - Document maintenance requirement in Condition I.G; and
 - Provision allowing EPA to require unspecified additional testing procedures for liners and geosynthetics in Condition III.A.2.a.

The petitioner argues that all eight conditions are not supported by regulatory and/or statutory authorities. Consequently, the petitioner maintains that these conditions should be deleted entirely since they were not made available for comment.

- Level of Detail. Wayne believes that the Agency's decision to require the use of ASTM D751 Method A Procedure 1 as the hydrostatic resistance test method is not justified. The petitioner contends that ASTM D751 states that any machine that meets the specified requirements is a valid machine for this test. Wayne argues that the machine used in ASTM D3786 meets the specifications and therefore is a valid machine for conducting the test. Wayne further argues that Region 2 and other Regions have accepted the use of D3786 with the concurrence of EPA's Cincinnati research laboratory.
- **Joint Permitting.** Both Ford and Wayne note that the State permit issued in 1982 by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) to the facility referred only to Wayne as the permittee. Wayne also has the obligation under the license agreement to perform the myriad of conditions contained in the RCRA permit. The newest draft State permit refers to Ford as the titleholder to the land. The petitioners argue that if State law recognizes Wayne as the owner of the facility, the Agency must also do so as long as that position is consistent with Federal law. Ford maintains that acknowledging Ford as the titleholder, versus owner, would ensure legal parallelism and avoid confusion.



- Permit Conditions that are Technically Inappropriate. Wayne contends that several final permit conditions are technically inappropriate:
 - Wayne argues that notification and reporting of liquids once detected in the secondary collection system is burdensome and unworkable, because the facility's disposal cell design is constructed so that liquid will continuously be present in the secondary collection system. The facility has a formal secondary leachate collection system monitoring program under the MDNR portion of the permit that satisfies all of the objectives of the HSWA permit condition.
 - Wayne objects to provisions requiring the facility to use the compatibility QA/QC to document how leachate was consistently the same during the test period. The petitioner argues that this is an unfounded and scientifically impossible requirement given the absence of leachate consistency in the QA/QC program.
 - Wayne argues that the requirement to use FTMS 101B (Method 2031) as the puncture resistance test method is technically inappropriate. The petitioner contends that EPA's Cincinnati research laboratory stopped recommending Method 2031 approximately five years ago, and none of the testing labs currently perform Method 2031 as a routine procedure for puncture resistance. Research laboratories are now using FTMS 101C, Method 2065.
 - The petitioner contends that the required geomembrane hardness test value of 60 Shore D units for the involved geomembranes is not appropriate. Wayne argues that current geomembrane manufacturers will not warrant or guarantee their product for hardness values above 55 Shore D units. Consequently, the petitioner believes that the hardness value of 60 Shore D units should be replaced with 55 Shore D units.
 - The petitioner maintains that the criteria of an average hydrostatic resistance value of 650 psi and 810 psi are inappropriate. Appropriate values as used by the National Seal Company are 600 and 750 psi, respectively.
- Inclusion of Ford as Permittee. The petitioners argue that the Agency is relying on an unpromulgated policy that the titleholders of property on which hazardous waste facilities are located are required to be named as permittees under RCRA.
 - Wayne contends that 40 CFR Section 270.10(b) merely requires that the owner sign the permit application, which Ford has done, while requiring that the operator obtain the permit. Wayne further contends that in two Federal court cases under the Federal Clean Water Act, both the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that EPA may not go



outside its regulations and use unpromulgated policies, memoranda, or guidelines to enforce environmental regulatory requirements.

- The petitioners contend that Ford had no responsibility for constructing and operating the facility.
- Under the terms of its agreement with Ford, Wayne owns all buildings and improvements at the facility.
- Furthermore, the petitioners argue that Ford is not an owner of the "facility" as defined in 40 CFR Section 270.2 or Section 260.10.
- Ford and Wayne argue that it would be in violation of Section 706 of the Administrative Procedures Act to impose permit liability upon the owner when the owner does not have the property interest necessary to comply with permit conditions.
- Including Ford as permittee would compel Ford and Wayne to become partners in the operation, thus destroying Wayne's separate property rights. Such an outcome would constitute an impairment of the contract obligations and in turn violate the operator's rights under the U.S. Constitution.
- Wayne contests that an analysis of RCRA permits did not find one effective permit which included an owner of the land as a permittee, but did discover several situations where facilities have different owners and operators but only the operator is listed on the permit.

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FACILITY: Michigan Disposal, Inc. (MDI)

Belleville, Michigan MID 000 724 831

RCRA Appeal No. 90-9A

PETITIONERS: - MDI

- Ford Motors Company (Ford)

PETITIONS FILED: May 1, 1990

STATUS OF PETITIONS: See Permit Appeal Status Report

ISSUES: - RFI conditions are not justified

Joint permitting

- Miscellaneous other issues (waste testing for compliance


with land disposal restrictions; inclusion of Ford as

permittee)

Summary of Petition:


Since 1969 Ford has allowed MDI to use land owned by Ford in Belleville, Michigan, to construct and operate a hazardous waste disposal facility. MDI and Ford are petitioning for review of the HSWA permit issued by Region 5 that names both companies as permittees. Both petitioners assert that there is no authority under Federal law to include Ford as a permittee. In addition, MDI contends that permit conditions requiring the testing of pre-acceptance waste samples and corrective action are unnecessary, expensive, and redundant.

- RFI Conditions are not Justified. MDI objects to performing a facility investigation to identify all solid waste management units (SWMUs) and releases of hazardous constituents. After clean closure of MDI's old plant, the area will be developed into a hazardous waste landfill cell by Wayne Disposal Inc. (Wayne). Because the facility's location is completely within Wayne's licensed area, Wayne will be responsible for SWMU identification, release identification, and corrective action. The petitioner further contends that if MDI completes clean closure, the possibility of a release due to past activities will have been eliminated.
- Joint Permitting. Both Ford and MDI note that the State permit issued in 1982, by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) to the facility, referred only to MDI as the licensee. MDI also has the obligation under the license agreement to perform the myriad of conditions contained in the RCRA permit. The newest draft State permit refers to Ford as



the titleholder to the land. The petitioners argue that if State law recognizes MDI as the owner of the facility, the Agency must also do so as long as that position is consistent with Federal law. Ford maintains that acknowledging Ford as the titleholder, versus owner, would ensure legal parallelism and avoid confusion.

- Waste Testing for Compliance with Land Disposal Restrictions. Wastes accepted by the facility are treated for conformance with all applicable land disposal restrictions (LDRs) and then shipped to a properly licensed landfill. Each year a re-approval analysis is conducted to ensure that the waste is acceptable and can be successfully treated by MDI's process. The petitioner contends that because treatment residues are tested prior to leaving MDI, testing incoming waste in addition to current annual re-approval requirements is an unnecessary, expensive, and redundant requirement.
- Inclusion of Ford as Permittee. The petitioners argue that the Agency is relying on an unpromulgated policy that the titleholders of property on which hazardous waste facilities are located are required to be named as permittees under RCRA.
 - MDI contends that 40 CFR Section 270.10(b) merely requires that the owner sign the permit application, which Ford has done, while requiring that the operator obtain the permit. MDI further contends that in two Federal court cases under the Federal Clean Water Act, both the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that EPA may not go outside its regulations and use unpromulgated policies, memoranda, or guidelines to enforce environmental regulatory requirements.
 - The petitioners contend that Ford had no responsibility for constructing and operating the facility.
 - Under the terms of its agreement with Ford, MDI owns all buildings and improvements at the facility.
 - Furthermore, the petitioners argue that Ford is not an owner of the "facility" as defined in 40 CFR Sections 270.2 or 260.10.
 - Ford and MDI argue that it would be in violation of Section 706 of the Administrative Procedures Act to impose permit liability upon the owner when the owner does not have the property interest necessary to comply with permit conditions.
 - Including Ford as permittee would compel Ford and MDI to become partners in the
 operation, thus destroying MDI's separate property rights. Such an outcome would
 constitute an impairment of the contract obligations and in turn violate the operator's
 rights under the U.S. Constitution.



1990

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which included an owner of the land as a permittee, but did discover several situations
where facilities have different owners and operators but only the operator is listed on
the permit.

BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C.

In the Matter of:

Ford Motor Company

Applicant

Permit No. MOD048090633

In the Matter of:

Michigan Disposal, Inc. and Ford Motor Company

Applicants

Permit No. MID000724831

RCRA Appeal No. 90-9

RCRA Appeal No. 90-9A

ORDER DENYING REVIEW

This decision consolidates appeals of two RCRA permits, issued by U.S. EPA Region V, relating to separate hazardous waste facilities. One facility is owned and operated by Wayne Disposal, Inc. ("Wayne"), and one is owned and operated by Michigan Disposal, Inc. ("MDI"). These appeals have been consolidated because they raise a common legal issue regarding Ford Motor Company's status as a permittee on the two permits.

By separate petitions, both dated May 1, 1990, MDI and Ford each seek review of the permit relating to MDI's facility. As requested by the Agency's Chief Judicial Officer, Region V filed a response to these petitions dated June 25, 1990. By a petition dated May 1, 1990, Ford also seeks review of the RCRA permit

relating to Wayne's facility. 1/ As requested by the Agency's Chief Judicial Officer, Region V filed a response to this petition dated June 25, 1990. MDI and Ford have filed replies to the Region's responses.

Under the rules that govern this proceeding, a RCRA permit ordinarily will not be reviewed unless it is based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of law, or involves an important matter of policy or exercise of discretion that warrants review. See 40 CFR §124.19; 45 Fed. Reg. 33412 (May 19, 1980). The preamble to Section 124.19 states that "this power of review should be only sparingly exercised," and that "most permit conditions should be finally determined at the Regional level * * *." Id. The burden of demonstrating that review is warranted is thus on the petitioners. The petitioners in this case have not carried that burden.

I. Ford's Status as a Permittee

Pursuant to a license agreement, Ford has allowed Wayne to use land owned by Ford to construct and operate a waste disposal facility. Under the agreement, the buildings and improvements on the land are the personal property of Wayne and are to be removed at the termination of the license period unless they are being used to satisfy closure and post-closure requirements. Ford is not involved in the operation of the facility in any way. Ford's

Wayne Disposal, Inc. also filed a petition for review, but later withdrew it pursuant to a settlement agreement with Region V.

relationship to Wayne's facility is, for purposes of this case, identical to Ford's relationship to MDI's facility. The petitions raise the issue of whether, under the circumstances outlined above, Ford should be named as a permittee on the two permits.

Petitioners argue that, under such circumstances, Ford should not be named as a permittee because Ford is not an owner of the facility. And even if Ford should be deemed an owner of the facility, Petitioners contend that Ford is not required to be a permittee because the facility is operated by another person (Wayne or MDI). Petitioners assert that, when the facility is owned by one person and operated by another person, the owner is required to sign the permit application but is not required to be a permittee. For the following reasons, I conclude that petitioners' arguments are baseless and that the issue does not merit review.

In each case, it is beyond serious dispute that the real property owned by Ford is part of the facility in question. The term "facility" is defined as "all contiguous land, and structures, other appurtenances, and improvements on the land, used for treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste." 40 CFR §260.10 (1990) (emphasis added). Petitioners argue that Ford's land is not being "used for treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste." I disagree. In common usage, land is deemed to be "used" for whatever activities are conducted on the land, even if the activities take place inside buildings

on the land. This conclusion is confirmed by Ford's own petition, which states that "Ford has allowed Wayne to use land owned by Ford in Belleville, Michigan to construct and to operate a waste disposal facility in accordance with government laws, orders, rules and regulations." (Ford's Wayne Petition, at 2) (emphasis added). Clearly, Ford's land is part of the "facility," and, under the rules, a person who owns part of a facility is deemed to be the owner of the facility. See 40 CFR §260.10 (1990) ("Owner" defined as "the person who owns a facility or part of a facility.") (emphasis added). In light of these considerations, I conclude that Ford is an owner of the facility.

Petitioners argue, however, that even if Ford is deemed to be an owner of the facility, Ford is not required to be a permittee because another person (Wayne or MDI) operates the facility. In support of this argument, Petitioners rely on 40 CFR §270.10(b), which provides as follows:

Who applies? When a facility or activity is owned by one person but is operated by another person, it is the operator's duty to obtain a permit, except that the owner must also sign the permit application.

40 CFR §270.10(b) (1990). Petitioner's argue that, under Section 270.10(b), Ford is required to sign the permit, but only the operator (Wayne or MDI) is required to be a permittee.

The same argument was raised and rejected in <u>Hawaiian</u>

<u>Western Steel, Ltd., Inc. and James Campbell Estate</u>, RCRA (3008)

Appeal No. 88-2 (Nov. 17, 1988) (Order Denying Petition for Reconsideration on Interlocutory Appeal) (a RCRA penalty case).

In that case, then-Administrator Lee M. Thomas explained that Section 270.10(b) is meant only to relieve the owner of responsibility for filing a separate permit application. Id. at 6. Administrator Thomas made it clear that Section 270.10(b) "in no way excuses an owner from having a permit, an obligation that flows implicitly from the act of signing the permit application and explicitly from the commands of Section 270.1(c)." Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Section 270.1(c) provides that "[o]wners and operators of hazardous waste management units must have permits during the active life * * * of the unit." 40 CFR §270.1(c) (1990) (emphasis added). Administrator Thomas observed that the language of Section 270.1(c)

fully implements the mandate of Section 3005(a) and clearly suffices to hold an owner, such as the Estate, liable for failure to have a permit. This much is beyond dispute.

Hawaiian Western, at 4.

Petitioners nevertheless believe that "the original intent of [Section 270.10(b)] was to relieve owners of land from being named as co-permittees." (Reply Brief, at 2) (emphasis in the original). In support of this belief, petitioners cite the preamble that accompanied the adoption of Section 122.4, a precursor of Section 270.10(b). The part of the preamble quoted by petitioners reads as follows:

Some commentators sought clarification of what happens when the owner and operator are not the same, and expressed concern that requirements of the permit program might, by virtue of this definition, be imposed on landowners who have no involvement in operation of a permitted activity. To address this concern, we have amended §122.4, application for a permit, to provide

that the operator is responsible for obtaining a permit and complying with it when ownership and operation are split. However, RCRA applications must be signed both by the owner and operator.

45 Fed. Reg. 33295 (May 19, 1980). Petitioners have seriously distorted the meaning of the quoted passage by taking it out of context. When read in context, the passage means the exact opposite of what petitioners say it means. Section 122.4, referred to in the quoted passage, covered applications not just for RCRA permits, but for other types of permits as well. 40 CFR §122.4 (1980) (UIC and NPDES). With respect to those other types of permits, Section 122.4 did relieve the owner of responsibility for complying with the permit in cases where the facility was operated by another person. With respect to RCRA permits, however, Section 122.4 did not relieve the owner of that responsibility. Instead, Section 122.4 required the owner of a RCRA facility to sign the application and made the owner subject to the requirements of the permit. That Section 122.4 was not meant to relieve owners of responsibility under RCRA permits is made perfectly clear in the very next sentence after the passage quoted in petitioners' brief, which reads as follows:

The requirements of a RCRA permit bind both the "owner" and the "operator" of the permitted facility, while the requirements of other permits subject to this Part bind only the permit holder.

45 Fed. Reg. 33295 (May 19, 1980). It is made even clearer two paragraphs later:

To ensure that both the owner and the operator understand their joint responsibility [under a RCRA permit], EPA is requiring both the owner and the operator to sign the permit application.

Id. And still clearer a few sentences later:

EPA anticipates that in most cases the operator will take the lead role in complying with all but the few conditions that only the owner can satisfy. The owner is free to make arrangements with the operator by contract or otherwise to assure itself that the operator will take most actions necessary for compliance activities beyond that. Nonetheless, EPA considers both parties responsible for compliance with the regulations.

Id. (emphasis added). Another part of the same preamble explains that the RCRA regulations are meant to apply to absentee owners like Ford:

Some facility owners have historically been absentees, knowing and perhaps caring little about the operation of the facility on their property. The Agency believes that Congress intended that this should change and that they should know and understand that they are assuming joint responsibility for compliance with these regulations when they lease their land to a hazardous waste facility. Therefore, to ensure their knowledge, the Agency will require owners to co-sign the permit application and any final permit for the facility.

Id. at 33169. Thus, petitioners' characterization of the regulatory history of Section 270.10(b) is seriously misleading. The regulatory history clearly supports the conclusion that Ford, as the absentee owner of the facility, should be named as a permittee.

The regulations requiring absentee owners to become permittees faithfully implement Congressional intent. As EPA's Chief Judicial Officer pointed out in Arrcom.Inc., RCRA (3008) Appeal No. 86-6 (May 19, 1986), the express language of RCRA reflects Congressional intent to impose RCRA requirements on both owners and operators of facilities. Section 3004 of RCRA directs the Administrator to promulgate regulations "applicable to owners

and operators of facilities for the treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste * * *. " 42 U.S.C. §6924 (emphasis added). Section 3005(a) of RCRA provides, without qualification, that

the Administrator shall promulgate regulations requiring each person <u>owning or operating</u> an existing facility or planning to construct a new facility for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste * * to have a permit issued pursuant to this section.

42 U.S.C. §6925 (a). Thus, Congress clearly intended to subject absentee owners to liability under RCRA. 2/

II. Other Issues in MDI's Petition

In addition to the issue relating to Ford's status as a permittee, MDI raises two issues in its petition, relating to:

(1) the requirement that permittees test pre-acceptance samples of waste more than once a year, and (2) the requirement that the permittees conduct a facility investigation to identify all solid waste management units and all releases of hazardous constituents and to perform corrective action if necessary, even though MDI's facility is completely surrounded by Wayne's facility and Wayne

Ford argues that requiring it to be a permittee is unduly burdensome because, under its agreement with the operator (Wayne or MDI), Ford does not have the right to take actions that are necessary to comply with the permit. Ford argues that it "should not be placed in jeopardy of violating the law by action or inaction of another party unrelated and uncontrolled by Ford." (Ford Reply Brief, at 4). Ford's real quarrel is with the regulations. If Ford has been placed in jeopardy, it is the regulations that have placed it there. Section 124.19, which governs this appeal, authorizes me to review contested permit conditions, but it is not intended to provide a forum for entertaining challenges to the validity of the applicable regulations.

will conduct an investigation of the whole area. Only the first issue is discussed below. With respect to the second issue, for the reasons set forth in the Region's response to MDI's petition, I conclude that MDI has failed to show that the Region's permit decision is clearly erroneous or otherwise warrants review.

MDI seeks review of Condition B.5. of the Waste Analysis
Plan in the permit. Condition B.5. requires MDI to test samples
of waste to be treated at its facility. Specifically, MDI
challenges the frequency with which this testing must be
performed. Condition B.5. provides as follows:

Samples of each waste stream received by the Permittees shall be evaluated and analyzed to determine if they are restricted from land disposal. Samples shall be representative pre-acceptance samples, taken before shipment, and shall be tested according to the following schedule:

Waste Shipments Per Year Testing Schedule Per Year

confirmation testing.
Generator data must be
accurate and reported.
Confirmation Test/Year
Confirmation Tests/Year
Confirmation Tests/Year

(Permit Attachment I, Condition B.5.)

The regulatory authority for Condition B.5. is Section 264.13. That section requires the owner or operator of a treatment facility to "obtain a detailed chemical and physical analysis of a representative sample of the wastes" to be treated at the facility. 40 CFR §264.13(a)(1) (1990). The analysis must be performed before the owner or operator treats the waste. Id. Under Section 264.13(a)(3), "[t]he analysis must be repeated as

necessary to ensure that it is accurate and up to date." 40 CFR $\S 264.13(a)(3)$ (1990) (emphasis added). 3/

MDI believes that it is unnecessary to link the frequency of testing to the number of shipments received by the treatment facility from a particular generator. 4/ The testing schedule in

The owner or operator of an off-site facility must inspect and, if necessary, analyze each hazardous waste movement received at the facility to determine whether it matches the identity of the waste specified on the accompanying manifest or shipping paper.

40 CFR §264.13(a)(4) (1990). I believe counsel has misunderstood what the permit writer intended. The purpose of the inspection and, in some cases, analysis required by paragraph (a) (4) is "to determine whether [each waste shipment] matches the identity of the waste specified on the accompanying manifest or shipping paper." In contrast, Condition B.5. states that the purpose of the waste analysis is "to determine if [the samples] are restricted from land disposal." Moreover, Paragraph (a) (4) emphasizes conducting an inspection of each hazardous waste shipment received at the facility, whereas an actual analysis of the waste is not required unless the results of the inspection suggest that one is necessary. In contrast, Condition B.5. says nothing about inspections and requires an analysis at regular intervals. In light of these considerations, I believe that Condition B.5. is more easily read as implementing paragraphs (a) (1) and (a) (3), rather than paragraph (a) (4).

Counsel for the Region reads Condition B.5. as implementing the inspection requirement of paragraph (a)(4) of Section 264.13, which provides as follows:

In its response to MDI's petition, the Region states that, under Condition B.5., "generators who send eleven to thirty waste shipments to MDI within a year must perform pre-acceptance sampling semiannually; generators who send more than thirty waste shipments to MDI within a year must perform pre-acceptance sampling on a quarterly basis." (Region's Response to Petition, at 11) (emphasis added). MDI believes that this statement is misleading because Condition B.5. imposes duties on MDI, and not on the generators of the waste. MDI is correct in believing that it is ultimately responsible for seeing that the testing required by Condition B.5 is performed. But I do not believe the Region meant to imply otherwise. In all probability, the Region was only trying to communicate the idea that the number of waste (continued...)

B.5. is based on the assumption that the more shipments the facility receives from a particular generator, the more testing the facility should do. MDI argues that "the number of shipments from a generator is not rationally connected to the need for a waste analysis * * *." (MDI's Reply Brief, at 6.) I disagree. It seems reasonable to conclude that, as the number of shipments increases, so too will the likelihood of a change in the consistency of the hazardous waste. To ensure that the analysis is accurate and up-to-date, therefore, the number of tests should also increase. Thus, MDI has not carried its burden of showing that the frequency of testing prescribed in Condition B.5. is clearly erroneous or otherwise warrants review. ²/

^{4/(...}continued)
shipments from a generator in a given year determines the frequency of the required testing.

In its challenge to Condition B.5., MDI also challenges Condition II.A.4., treating the two as one condition. Condition II.A.4. also requires MDI to perform waste analysis, as follows:

The Permittees must test the wastes, or extracts of the wastes or treatment residues to assure that wastes, extracts or treatment residues are in compliance with the applicable treatment standards set forth in 40 CFR Part 268, Subpart D and all applicable prohibitions set forth in 40 CFR Part 268, Subpart C or in RCRA Section 3004(d). Such testing must be performed according to the frequency specified in the Permittee's Waste Analysis Plan (Attachment I) as required by 40 CFR §264.13.

Because the testing required by Condition II.A.4. must be done according to the schedule set out in Condition B.5., MDI apparently assumed that Condition II.A.4. and Condition B.5. are really just different parts of the same condition. But that is not the proper way to read them. The two provisions are separate conditions implementing different waste analysis requirements in the rules. As discussed in the text, the regulatory authority (continued...)

III. Conclusion

Petitioners have not shown that the decision to name Ford as permittee or the decision to include the contested conditions in MDI's permit are clearly erroneous. Nor have they shown that this case involves important policy issues that warrant review. Accordingly, the petitions are hereby denied.

So ordered.

Dated: OCT 2 1991

William K. Reilly Administrator

for Condition B.5. is Section 264.13. Condition II.A.4., on the other hand, is based on the waste analysis requirement of Section 268.7(b), which requires treatment facilities to test their wastes after treatment. The purpose of the testing required under Section 268.7(b) is to ensure that the treated waste meets the treatment standards and prohibitions of Part 268, which contains restrictions on land disposal. 40 CFR §268.7(b) (1990). Under Section 268.7(b), treatment facilities must perform the tests "according to the frequency specified in their waste analysis plans as required by §264.13 or §265.13." Id.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Order Denying Review in the matter of Ford Motor Company, RCRA Appeal No. 90-9 and Michigan Disposal, Inc., RCRA Appeal No. 90-9A, were sent to the following persons in the manner indicated:

By First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid:

James E. Morris Assistant Regional Counsel U.S. EPA, Region V 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, IL 60604

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Dated:

OCT 0 9 1991

Mildred T. Connelly, Secretary to the Judicial Officer