

Consideration of pathogen risks associated with uncovered finished water reservoirs

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Pathogen testing of waters

- No ideal indicator
- Not all about *Cryptosporidium*
- Target < 0.075 oocysts /1000L
or < 1 in 10,000 L need
to take $\gg 200$ 50-L samples
(noting method recovery generally $< 50\%$ and
non-normal input/distribution of oocysts in water)
- **Key issue: what is the change in relative risk
due to an uncovered finished water (UCFWR)**





Risk = probability x consequence


- Therefore pathogen risk is based on **likelihood of occurrence & consequence of disease** endpoint(s); So for LT2 & in UCFWR
 - Interested in gastrointestinal (GI) disease
 - But other endpoints & sequelae possible, e.g.
 - *E. coli* O157:H7 but may also cause HUS
 - *Campylobacter jejuni* causes reactive arthritis & Guillain Barré syndrome



Models provide supporting info

- Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment (QMRA) to inform change in risk from UCFWR:
 - Need to ID **potential sources/routes of concern** of pathogen contamination to UCFW reservoirs
 - **Model/measure fate & transport to provide relative risk** by pathogen that an uncovered reservoir may introduce

Animals identified in UCFWR



Photos: Staff of the California Drinking Water Program



Why Model?

- Models help us explore questions that we might not be able to address in the laboratory or field; for example:
 - What is the waterfowl risk to reservoir waters under condition X?
 - What is the impact of reservoir turn-over?
 - When may it be safe to restart service after an event for an UCFWR?



Pathogen hazards: mostly zoonotic

Portland reservoir urination raises a few concerns (Oregon *Live.com*, 6/15/11)

- 21 year-old's event led to draining 7.8 MG Mt. Tabor R
- Risk was human access 'thought it was a sewer plant'

Zoonosis – pathogen from animal-to-human

- A few are viral (HEV wild pigs, H5N1 virus in birds), range of pathogenic bacterial & parasitic protozoa

Which animal groups of concern:

- **Birds** (e.g. H1N1, *Cryptosporidium meleagridis*, *Giardia lamblia*, *Salmonella enterica*, *Campylobacter jejuni*), **rodents** (most as above) **rabbits** (*C. cuniculus*)



Understanding (fecal) sources

- Animal surveys / by season / risk periods
- qPCR for various pathogens / indicators
- Microbial Source Tracking (MST)
 - *Bacteroidales* targets, yet poorly developed for non-ruminants & birds
 - Emerging use whole genome sequencing
- Chemical biomarkers to ID sources
 - Fecal sterols, biomass assays



Source (g feces/d)	Pathogens	Counts/gram	D-R
Birds, e.g. ducks (30-360)	H5N1, <i>Cryptosporidium meleagridis</i> , <i>Giardia lamblia</i> , microsporidia*, <i>Salmonella</i> , <i>Campylobacter</i> & <i>Mycobacterium</i> spp.	P/A, ranges 10 ² -10 ⁴ /g	H5N1 Sal Campy
Rodents (2-30)	<i>Cryptosporidium parvum</i> , <i>Salmonella</i> , <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7	10 ² -10 ⁴ /g P/A	?
Rabbits (20-80)	<i>Cryptosporidium cuniculus</i> , <i>Staphylococcus aureus</i> (+ARG), <i>Francisella tularensis</i>	3000/g P/A	illness
Feral cats	<i>Toxoplasma gondii</i> ,	P/A	-
Environ-mental	<i>Schistosoma</i> spp., <i>Mycobacterium avium</i> (↑virulent strains from animals)	P/A	-

Increasing risk?

P/A presence/absent data only, ARG – antibiotic-resistant genes

**Encephalitozoon hellem*, *E. intestinalis*, & *Enterocytozoon bieneusi*



Model/measure fate & transport

- Various model components can be estimated with surrogates:
 - Fecal loadings (*E. coli*, enterococci, MST) & HRT
 - Environmental inactivation (light intensity + temp)
 - Algae-association, reservoir turn-over (re-suspension) of sediment-bound pathogens
- Role of algae?
 - May lead to growth of some bacterial pathogens & indicators
 - Toxins?



Reservoir


water
QMRA

**Goal: estimate the relative risk increase
(for water in vs out of the UC reservoir)**


model

STEP 1
SETTING


Hazard identification & pathways
Describe physical system, selection of **reference pathogens** & identification of **hazardous events**



Viruses



Bacteria



Parasitic protozoa

STEP 1 SETTING


Hazard identification & its setting
Describe physical system, selection of reference pathogens and identification of hazardous events



For each reference pathogen:

Reservoir QMRA model

STEP 2 EXPOSURE




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Hazard identification & its setting
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Reservoir
QMRA
model

**STEP 2
EXPOSURE**



STEP 3 HEALTH EFFECTS

Dose-Response (P_{inf})
Selection of appropriate model & dose for each pathogen and scenario


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Reservoir
QMRA
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
STEP 2 EXPOSURE



STEP 3 HEALTH EFFECTS



STEP 4 RISK





Conclusions

- Uncovered finish water reservoirs are vulnerable to fecal inputs, in decreasing order of likely pathogen risks as follows:
 - Birds
 - Rodent
 - Feral cats (& dogs)
- Additional treatment could negate risks
- Very large numbers of samples required to measure pathogen risk impacts due to UCFWR