


EPA Tools & Resources Webinar: Detection of SARS CoV-2 in Wastewater to Inform Public Health

Jay Garland, PhD
US EPA Office of Research and Development

December 16, 2020





SARS-CoV-2 in Sewage

- **Virus is shed in feces by individuals with symptomatic and asymptomatic infection**
- **Variable SARS-CoV-2 load in feces: 10^3 - 10^7 RNA copies/gram¹**
- **Approximately 75-80% US is served by municipal sewage systems²**
- **SARS-CoV-2 has been detected in raw sewage**
 - US, Europe, Australia, Africa, etc.
 - Up to 10^7 RNA copies/L³
- **Low risk of wastewater as vehicle for transmission**
 - Limited reports of infectious virus in feces^{4,5}; none from sewage
 - No additional risk to wastewater workers⁶
 - Treatment and disinfection are likely effective



Photo credit: <https://www.usgs.gov>

¹Foladori et al. 2020. Science of the Total Environment 743:140444; ²USEPA. 2016. EPA-830-R15005; ³<https://www.lacsd.org/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?blobid=%20222002>; ⁴Xiao et al., Emerging Infectious Diseases, 26(8), 1920-1922; ⁵Zhou et al. 2020. Nature Medicine 26:1077-1083; ⁶<https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/covid-19/solid-waste-wastewater-mgmt.html>



Wastewater Surveillance

Illicit Drugs in Municipal Sewage

Proposed New Nonintrusive Tool to Heighten Public Awareness of Societal Use of Illicit-Abused Drugs and Their Prevalence

Christian G. Daughton

Environmental Health Perspectives • VOLUME 116 | NUMBER 8 | August 2008

DOI: 10.1021/bk-2001-07

Publication Date: July 30,

Estimating Community Drug Abuse

Ettore Zuccato, Chiara Chiabrando, Sara Castiglioni, R

Department of Environmental Health Sciences, Istituto di Ric

NEWS & ANALYSIS | INFECTIOUS DISEASE

Israel's Silent Polio Epidemic Breaks All the Rules

Leslie Roberts

+ See all authors and affiliations

OPEN

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Epidemiol. Infect. (2012), **140**, 1–13. © Cambridge University Press and World Health Organization. WHO has granted permission to Cambridge University Press to publish the contribution written by the author. This article may not be reprinted or reused in any way in order to promote any commercial product. doi:10.1017/S095026881000316X



REVIEW ARTICLE

Role of environmental poliovirus surveillance in polio eradication and beyond

Research

Environmental surveillance of poliovirus in Dakar, Senegal (2007–2013)

Abdou Kader Ndiaye^{1,a}, Pape Amadou Mbathio Diop¹, Ousma



RESEARCH ARTICLE
Applied and Environmental Science



Retrospective Surveillance of Wastewater To Examine Seasonal Dynamics of Enterovirus Infections

Nichole E. Brinkman,^{a,b} G. Shay Fout,^a Scott P. Keely^{a,b}



Wastewater-based SARS-CoV-2 Surveillance

- Complements existing COVID-19 surveillance systems
- Advantages
 - Non-invasive
 - Pool of individuals
 - Asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals
 - Inexpensive
 - Data for communities where individual testing data are underutilized or unavailable
 - Scalable
 - Unbiased
 - Can be a leading indicator of changes in community-level infection





Outline for Presentation

- Analytical method development
- Understanding dilution and degradation in the sewer
- Relating the sewer signal to community case rates
- Building a statewide network of sampling
- Translating the information into public health decisions



Method Considerations

Sample Type


Untreated wastewater
Primary sludge
Volume

Sample Preparation

Storage temperature
Homogenization
Additives
Matrix Spike
Clarification

Sample Concentration

Ultrafiltration
Electronegative membrane filtration
Polyethylene glycol (PEG) precipitation



Nucleic Acid Extraction

Silica columns
Magnetic beads
Precipitation

RNA/DNA Measurement

RT-qPCR
RT-ddPCR
Genetic targets

Other Considerations

Biosafety
Supply Chain issues
Practicality (time, equipment)
QA/QC




Biosafety

- Wastewater risk is the same
- Increased risk with processes that could generate aerosols
 - Centrifugation
 - Membrane filtration
- CDC recommendations¹
 - Biosafety Level 2 laboratory
 - Biosafety Level 3 precautions
 - Respiratory protection
 - Designated donning/doffing area
- Borrowing lab space in AWBERC Biocontainment Suite
- Safety, Health and Environmental Management (SHEM)
- ORD's BioRisk Management Advisory Committee




Brian Morris

¹<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/lab/lab-biosafety-guidelines.html#environmental>




- **Limit of Detection**
 - 655 RNA Molecules/L
- **Recovery Efficiency**
 - Endogenous virus
 - crAssphage 84%
 - PMMoV 27%
 - Matrix spike
 - Betacoronavirus OC43 (up to 50%)
- **RT-ddPCR Inhibition**
 - Minimal (< 20%)




Chloe Hart

Supply Chain Disruption #1




Ultrafiltration – Millipore Centricon Plus-70 centrifugal Units




~ 90% measurable virus in pellet and filter fractions


Supply Chain Disruption #2



Supply Chain Disruption #2



Ana Braam





Trizol-Chloroform Extraction RNA precipitation



Phase separation

Isopropanol precipitation






New extraction approach increased recovery efficiency 10-fold




Metropolitan Sewer District of Cincinnati



Sewershed	MGD	% Industrial	% Combined	Dilution
Mill Creek	118	5.0	40	0.5:1
Taylor Creek	3	0	0	1.8:1




Sub-Sewershed Sampling: Cincinnati





Sub-Sewershed Sampling – Lick Run

Combined
Sewer
Overflow



Remote Composite Sampler
~10L between 8-11 am
~500 ml every 15 min






Accounting for Dilution Impacts

Mill Creek

118 MGD, 5% Industrial, 40% Combined




	Correlation Coefficient	P-value
N1	0.43	0.0322
N1/crAv	0.59	0.00195
N2	0.483	0.0148
N2/crAv	0.563	0.000385




Flow volume
TSS
crAssphage
PMMov
HF183

Taylor Creek

3 MGD, 0% Industrial, 0% Combined



	Correlation Coefficient	P-value
N1	0.6	0.00201
N1/crAv	0.505	0.012
N2	0.521	0.00925
N2/crAv	0.529	0.00809




Different Views of Community Infection

Potential role of sentinel sites?


Red Line – County Infection Peak in early July




Temporal Trends of SARS-CoV-2 in Sewersheds




- N1
- N2
- N1-trizol
- N2-trizol




- N1
- N2
- N1-trizol
- N2-trizol




- N1
- N2
- N1-trizol
- N2-trizol




- N1
- N2
- N1-trizol
- N2-trizol




- N1
- N2
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- N2-trizol




- N1
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- N2-trizol




- N1
- N2
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
- N1
- N2
- N1-trizol
- N2-trizol



- N1
- N2
- N1-trizol
- N2-trizol



- N1
- N2
- N1-trizol
- N2-trizol



- N1
- N2
- N1-trizol
- N2-trizol

Range of minor peaks early, strong consistent increases across communities now

What do these data mean?

- If you want to relate SARS-CoV-2 wastewater data to the number of infected individuals, you need to know:
 - Concentration of SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater
 - Measured concentration
 - Recovery Efficiency
 - Dilution
 - Decay
 - And how much SARS-CoV-2 shed in feces (uncertain)
- Or focus on relative changes at a given site



Developing the Ohio Wastewater Monitoring Network



May
2020

Governor DeWine initiates wastewater SARS-CoV-2 monitoring project



Monitoring and Analyzing
July 2020

- 7 large cities
- 15 locations sampled
- 3 laboratories – OSU, UT, US EPA



Adding Sites
August – October 2020

- Medium and smaller cities
- 4 added laboratories – UA, KSU, Commercial lab, BGSU
- Sampling frequency twice a week
- Currently 52 sites




June
2020

Ohio EPA - \$2,000,000 for wastewater monitoring project via CARES funds
ODH is project lead
Ohio WRC project coordinator



Workgroups created
Part of CDC national monitoring network
Working on analytical methods
Working on data analysis

- Once a month
- SARS-CoV-2 positive sample send to all the labs
- Normal protocols performed
- Results analyzed





Ohio Wastewater Monitoring Network

The focus is on **trends or significant changes** in the number of viral gene copies detected.


Currently action is taken when at least 3 samples show a sustained increase of at least 10-fold (1 log)

Notify the local health district and utility

Provide information on how to interpret the data and link to message toolkit

Notify the state pandemic testing team for linkages to establish pop-up testing sites and the state contact tracing team to offer assistance

Wastewater Treatment Plant Locations and Boundaries



© 2020 Mapbox © OpenStreetMap
Click a site to zoom in and view data for that site. To return to the state view, click the site again.
When viewing on a mobile device, such as a phone or tablet, pinch with both fingers to move the map or zoom in on a specific area.


Language Translation

Ohio Department of Health

Coronavirus (COVID-19)

Ohio Public Health Advisory System Responsible RestartOhio Testing and Community Health Centers Families and Individuals Healthcare Professionals

Wastewater Treatment Plant Locations and Boundaries



© 2020 Mapbox © OpenStreetMap
Click a site to zoom in and view data for that site. To return to the state view, click the site again.
When viewing on a mobile device, such as a phone or tablet, pinch with both fingers to move the map or zoom in on a specific area.

<https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/dashboards/wastewater>



Ohio Public Health Applications

Development of toolkit for local health districts and utilities

- Additional messaging to public on best practices – social media, twitter

<https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/healthcare-providers-and-local-health-districts-for-local-health-districts-and-governments>

New focus on monitoring multiple sites on campus to support colleges/universities across state

Ohio is coordinating on data reporting approaches and with CDC on their National Wastewater Surveillance System

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/wastewater-surveillance.html>



Collaborations

Monitoring SARS-CoV-2 virus in wastewater as an indicator of changes in community-level infection is a topic of interest to many different organizations, and EPA is committed to leveraging partnerships and collaborations to achieve results. Some examples:

- **CDC** – Weekly exchange with staff scientists to both provide status of EPA work and info on the National Wastewater Surveillance System
- **Ohio Wastewater Monitoring Network** – Committed to conducting samples as part of lab network, provided initial guidance on sample handling, coordinated interlaboratory comparisons, and developed standard data collection formats for entire network
- **Public Utilities** – Research collaboration with Cincinnati MSD, reached out to Ohio utilities organizations (i.e., AOMWA, OWEA) early in the pandemic, participated in initial meetings with potential participating utilities in Ohio, presented on status/progress to California WEA
- **States** – Provided technical assistance to Arkansas, Maryland, New Jersey and New Mexico as they developed their wastewater surveillance efforts
- **Research Community** – Participated in the Water Research Foundation International Virtual Summit on the topic in April and subsequent interlaboratory comparison of methods organized by WRF, shared results with Global Water Research Coalition’s Workgroup on SARS-CoV2 sewage surveillance

- **Analytical Method Development**
 - No standard method, but many options available (useful to address supply chain)
 - Quality Control for assessing method performance (recovery efficiency, inhibition control)
- **Dilution/Degradation in Sewer System**
 - Ongoing comparison of different approaches to normalize for dilution
 - Use existing temperature dependent rates, targeted studies on industrial wastes
- **Relation of Sewer Signal to Infection rates**
 - Accounting for recovery efficiency, dilution, degradation
 - Need better data on shedding rates

- **Developing a network**

- Linking wastewater utilities, environmental analytical labs, public health agencies
- Network of labs to increase capacity if needed; build in QA/QC

- **Translating data to public health decisions**

- Focus on trends or significant changes in the concentration to reinforce public messaging
 - As models to predict infection are refined
- Early warning?
 - Relative turnaround time of individual and wastewater data key
 - Sentinel sites might be very useful, but attributes of these sites may vary across pandemic cycle
- Targeted sampling to direct individual testing/actions
 - e.g., university dormitory monitoring



Contact

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